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A Foreign Exchange Intervention in an 
Era of Restraint
Christopher J. Neely
The Japanese yen appreciated strongly and rapidly against other major currencies in the wake of
the massive March 11, 2011, Tohoku earthquake. High volatility and disorder in financial markets
prompted the G-7 authorities to jointly intervene to weaken the yen. This episode resembled the
two most recent G-7 coordinated interventions: the June 1998 effort to strengthen the yen and
the September 2000 effort to strengthen the euro. Exchange rates reacted strongly and quickly to
these three interventions, moving 3 to 4 percent in the desired direction within 30 minutes of the
announcement and exhibiting lower volatility in the following days. G-7 authorities have used
intervention very sparingly since 1995, yet the March 2011 policy action is a reminder that it can
be used to calm markets and move the exchange rate in the desired direction. Intervention has
become much less common but more successful. (JEL F31, E44, E58)
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expectations that Japanese insurance companies
would need to liquidate and repatriate reserves
held as foreign assets and (ii) the closing of “carry
trade” positions in which investors borrowed in
yen to lend abroad. In the days after the earth-
quake, the foreign currency and equity markets
became extremely volatile. 
In response to these volatile market condi-
tions, the G-7 finance ministers and central bank
governors announced late on Thursday, March 17,
that they would jointly intervene the next day to
reduce the value of the yen. The G-7 authorities
cited concerns about “excess volatility and dis-
orderly movements” in their intervention press
release. In response, the yen depreciated by 3 to
4 percent—depending on the exchange rate—
within hours.
This unusual intervention received limited
media coverage. Articles in the financial press
necessarily provided superficial coverage in the
available space (see Pett, 2011; Vieira, 2011b;
A
n enormous, 9.0-magnitude earth-
quake rocked Japan on March 11,
2011, unleashing a tsunami that
swamped the Japanese coast, killing
more than 15,000 people and causing hundreds
of billions of dollars of property damage.1 This
tremendous shock created great uncertainty in
Japanese financial markets, raising concerns about
future international trade and capital flows,
increased expectations of government default,
and reduced equity prices. 
The Japanese yen (JPY) rapidly appreciated
in the wake of the earthquake; from March 10 to
March 17, 2011, its value rose by about 5 percent
against the U.S. dollar (USD).2 The financial press
cited two factors contributing to the yen’s rise: (i)
1 See Hosaka (2011) and National Police Agency of Japan (2011).
2 The JPY/USD exchange rate fell from 82.98 JPY/USD at noon U.S.
eastern time on March 10 to 78.74 JPY/USD at the same time on
March 17, 2011. 
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briefly, but very usefully, summarized the facts
from the policymaker’s point of view. The rarity
of such episodes since 1995 and the limited press
coverage will leave many readers unfamiliar with
foreign exchange intervention as a policy tool.
This article describes and evaluates the suc-
cess of the March 2011 action as a representative
of a post-1995 policy of “rare” coordinated inter-
ventions in troubled markets. It details the macro-
economic and financial circumstances that
prompted the G-7 authorities to act and describes
the immediate effect on the exchange rate level
and volatility. The article also compares this action
with the two most recent U.S. foreign exchange
interventions in June 1998 and September 2000
and puts these three episodes in the context of
G-7 historical intervention experience.
Why study intervention? Exchange rate policy
is important because foreign exchange markets
are large and interconnected with stock and bond
markets. Disorder, or lack of two-sided liquidity
in foreign exchange markets, can spill over to
other asset markets.3 Big swings in exchange rates
can affect the balance sheets of banks and other
financial firms. In addition, intervention per se
can potentially offer important lessons for how
asset markets function. To which aspects of inter-
vention do exchange markets react? Through what
channels does intervention work?
Furthermore, because exchange rates are
important prices for international trade in goods
and services, swings in such rates can affect real
activity and international inflation rates. For exam-
ple, an excessive rise in the value of the yen could
impair Japanese tradable goods industries. And
in the long run, excessive volatility could discour-
age international trade. 
The next section defines foreign exchange
intervention and summarizes some research on
relevant issues. This is followed by a brief modern
history of intervention and then a section describ-
ing the March 2011 intervention to restrain the
yen. The circumstances and results of this inter-
vention are compared with the two other most




This section defines intervention, explains
how and why it is conducted and why it might
influence exchange rates, and briefly discusses
research on its effectiveness. 
What Is Foreign Exchange Intervention? 
Foreign exchange intervention is the practice
by monetary authorities or finance ministries of
buying and selling foreign currency to influence
exchange rates. In the United States, for example,
the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve gener-
ally collaborate on foreign exchange intervention
decisions, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York usually conducts such operations on behalf
of both.4
Central bank purchases or sales of a foreign
currency change the domestic monetary base.5
Without additional market transactions, such
actions would change interest rates, exchange
rates, and ultimately prices; it would simply be
ordinary monetary policy conducted in the for-
eign exchange market instead of domestic money
markets. Developed countries typically “sterilize”
their foreign exchange interventions, however,
which means that the central bank reverses the
effects of the foreign exchange transactions on
the monetary base. For example, if the New York
Fed—following the instructions of the Treasury
and the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC)—sold $500 million worth of yen (pur-
chased dollars), the U.S. monetary base would
decrease by $500 million in the absence of steril-
Neely
304 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
3 “Two-sided liquidity” means there are substantial numbers of
both active buyers and sellers in a market. 
4 The May 16, 1989, FOMC meeting transcript quotes Chairman
Alan Greenspan as stating, “The Treasury has the legal lead on
these [intervention] decisions. We discuss it with them but the
ultimate decisions are theirs” (Federal Open Market Committee,
1989a, p. 7).
5 The monetary base is the domestic currency in circulation plus
reserves of depository institutions held at the Federal Reserve
Banks. Equivalently, it can be defined as domestic credit plus for-
eign exchange reserves. ization. To prevent changes in domestic interest
rates and prices, the New York Fed would sterilize
the intervention by buying $500 million worth of
U.S. government securities, which would increase
commercial bank deposits with the Federal
Reserve, thereby replacing the liquidity previously
lost by the sale. To prevent yen-denominated
short-term interest rates from falling, the Bank of
Japan would need to conduct similar open market
sales of yen-denominated securities to absorb the
new liquidity and completely sterilize the original
transaction.6 Almost all central banks custom  -
arily target short-term interest rates, which makes
such sterilization automatic. The final net effect
of such a sterilized intervention would be to
decrease the supply of dollar-denominated secu-
rities relative to yen-denominated securities on
the market.
Why Intervene in Foreign Exchange
Markets? 
The “Foreign Currency Directive” of the
Federal Reserve System directs intervention to
“counter disorderly market conditions,” in coop-
eration with foreign central banks, consistent
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Articles of Agreement; Article IV, Section 1 for-
bids attempts to remedy balance of payments
problems by manipulating exchange rates.7 The
IMF does not precisely define “disorderly mar-
ket conditions”; the concept is open to interpre-
tation. In practice, researchers such as Edison
(1993) and Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996), as
well as official pronouncements, support the idea
that “countering disorderly market conditions”
means employing intervention to resist rapid
exchange rate changes that seem contrary to per-
ceived fundamentals. This practice is often called
“leaning against the wind” or described as reduc-
ing volatility in the market. 
Exchange rates are important prices that influ-
ence the time path of inflation and output. An
exchange rate that is significantly away from
“fundamental values” can destabilize capital
and trade flows that affect inflation and output.
Therefore, intervention against a recent exchange
rate trend is much more likely if (i) policymakers
believe that an exchange rate is “misaligned”—
that is, away from its fundamental value—and
(ii) the recent trend is even further away from the
perceived fundamental value of the exchange
rate.
The idea that exchange rates can be misaligned
is controversial. Fama’s (1970) efficient market
hypothesis suggests that asset prices always reflect
fundamentals to the point where the potential
excess returns do not exceed the transactions
costs of acting (trading) on that information
(Jensen, 1978). But it has proven very difficult to
consistently link exchange rates to fundamentals
in the short run. Researchers have put forward
a variety of reasons—entirely consistent with
rationality—to explain the persistent deviation
of exchange rates from fundamentals: risk aver-
sion, principal-agent problems, and learning and
information problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
explore how traders are constrained by risk and
principal-agent problems. Lewis (1989) and Klein
and Lewis (1993) explore how learning can affect
exchange rates. Whether markets are efficient or
not, many policymakers believe that exchange
rates can become misaligned from their funda-
mental values. Therefore, discussions of interven-
tion often include the idea of “misalignment”
from fundamentals or long-run equilibrium.
Although the policymaker’s view of the fun-
damental value of the exchange is not specified
and is not obvious, one can crudely calculate a
long-run tendency with reference to purchasing
power parity (PPP), which holds that exchange
rates reflect relative price levels in the long run.
The PPP-based estimate of the long-run tendency
is the predicted exchange rate from a regression
Neely
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6 In an environment in which short-term interest rates are essentially
zero, changes in the monetary base do not have the usual effects
on interest rates and prices. Short-term interest rates in both Japan
and the United States were close to the zero lower bound at the
time of the March intervention. Nevertheless, sterilization would
be required if the central banks had an implicit target for bank
reserves. 
7 The “Foreign Currency Directive” is published annually in the
minutes of the first FOMC meeting of the year. For an example,
see www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes2011
0126.htm. The IMF’s 1981 annual report, for example, states that
“A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary
to counter disorderly conditions, which may be characterized inter
alia by disruptive short-term movements in the exchange value
of its currency” (International Monetary Fund, 1981).of the log of that variable on a constant, a quad-
ratic time trend, and relative log price indexes.8
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the JPY/USD
exchange rate and its estimated long-run trend.
Panel B shows the time series of U.S. interven-
tions in the JPY/USD exchange rate; USD pur-
chases (sales) are positive (negative). Panel C
displays a scatterplot of the interventions versus
the deviations of the exchange rate from its trend.
The negative relation in panel C clearly shows
that U.S. authorities tend to buy dollars when the
price of dollars in terms of JPY is below its long-
run tendency and sell dollars when the JPY price
of dollars is above its long-run tendency. Contin  -
gency analysis confirms that most official U.S.
intervention in the deutsche mark (DEM) or euro
(EUR) and JPY markets is consistent with pushing
the exchange rate toward long-run equilibrium.
For example, about 61 percent of U.S. interven-
tions are in either the top-left or lower-right quad-
rant in panel C, indicating a USD sale when the
dollar is strong or a USD purchase when the dollar
is weak, respectively. Panel C displays the two
most recent U.S. interventions in the JPY market—
on June 17, 1998, and March 18, 2011—as solid
blue and black markers, respectively. These inter-
ventions are the two largest JPY interventions,
but they are consistent with the tendency of U.S.
authorities to buy (sell) dollars when the dollar
is weak (strong) relative to its long-run trend.9
How Might Foreign Exchange
Intervention Work?
Because sterilized intervention affects neither
prices nor interest rates, it does not influence the
exchange rate directly through these usual mech-
anisms. But official intervention might affect the
foreign exchange market indirectly through the
portfolio balance channel, the signaling channel,
and/or the coordination channel. 
The portfolio balance theory recognizes that
sterilized intervention changes the relative sup-
plies of bonds denominated in different currencies.
If bonds from different countries are imperfect
substitutes (as seems likely) and investors have
only a limited appetite for the bonds from a par-
ticular country at a given rate of return, then the
relative rate of return on, say, Japanese versus
U.S. bonds, must depend on the relative quantities
of those types of bonds. In the example in which
the Fed purchases dollars/sells yen, the interven-
tion increases the quantity of yen-denominated
bonds relative to dollar-denominated bonds.
Such an increase in the relative quantity of yen-
denominated assets means that international
investors will require a higher return on these
bonds. An immediate depreciation of the yen
creates a higher expected return on yen-
denominated assets without changing the long-
run value of the JPY/USD. Researchers are skep-
tical of the portfolio balance channel’s importance
because interventions are typically much, much
too small to significantly change the relative
quantities of bonds.
The signaling channel suggests that official
intervention communicates (signals) information
about future monetary policy. The literature on
intervention has not been kind to the signaling
hypothesis. Lewis (1995) and Kaminsky and
Lewis (1996) found that intervention generated
perverse impacts on monetary policy in their
sample. Fatum and Hutchison (1999) found that
intervention had no impact on federal funds
futures rates. Aside from the problem that inter-
vention seemingly does not affect expected mone-
tary policy, the signaling story seems implausible
because monetary policy and exchange rate policy
are often in the hands of different institutions. If
the U.S. Treasury has primary responsibility for
the value of the USD, for example, then how can
intervention signal anything about monetary
policy, which is in the hands of the FOMC?
The coordination channel, which suggests
that intervention might be important in coordi-
nating the expectations of market participants,
has received more attention recently. Sarno and
Taylor (2001), Taylor (2005), and Reitz and Taylor
(2008) have emphasized its potential importance
in communicating that authorities consider that
the exchange rate is deviating substantially from
Neely
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8 The quadratic time trend, which is highly statistically significant,
permits a time varying Balassa-Samuelson effect, which denotes
the tendency for differential productivity growth to affect real
(i.e., inflation-adjusted) exchange rates. 
9 One might expect intervention sizes to grow over time with the
size of financial markets. Neely
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The JPY/USD Exchange Rate and U.S. Intervention
NOTE: Panel A shows the JPY/USD exchange rate and a long-run equilibrium fundamental estimated from relative prices and a qua  d  -
ratic time trend. Panel B shows the U.S. foreign exchange intervention (millions of USD purchased) over the same sample. Panel C is
a scatterplot of nonzero U.S. intervention versus the deviation from the estimated trend. The June 17, 1998, and the March 18, 2011,
interventions are labeled in panels B and C. its long-run value. During such periods, it can be
extremely risky for individual investors to invest
much capital in hopes of a return to long-run
equilibrium. As Keynes noted, “Markets can
remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can
remain solvent” (see Shilling, 1993, p. 236).
Nevertheless, a foreign exchange intervention
can coordinate the expectations of market partici-
pants and lead investors to drive the exchange
rate back toward its long-run equilibrium. 
Does Intervention Work? 
There is no strong consensus on the effective-
ness of sterilized intervention in floating mar-
kets.10 Sarno and Taylor (2001) report mixed
evidence in their thorough survey of the literature.
More recently, Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz
(2010) report on the mostly limited success of
U.S. intervention efforts in the 1970s. Neely (2005)
argues that the problem in finding effects of inter-
vention is sorting out the simultaneity in the con-
ditions under which intervention is conducted
versus the effects of that intervention. Studies
that consider this problem more seriously—that is,
Kearns and Rigobon (2005) and Neely (2006)—
find that sterilized intervention does have desired
effects. Similarly, high-frequency studies, such
as Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and
Vitale (2003), which tend to be less afflicted by
simultaneity problems, have also found interven-
tion to be effective. Finally, Neely (2008) surveys
monetary authorities and finds that policymakers
experienced in floating exchange rate markets
overwhelmingly believe that intervention works
in floating exchange rates. 
In any case, developed countries have increas-
ingly avoided the practice of foreign exchange
intervention. Truman (2003) eloquently describes
a typical view among recent policymakers:
The evidence on the short-run effectiveness of
exchange market intervention is sufficient in
my view to support the judicious use of inter-
vention by the United States as a supplemen-
tary policy instrument as long as it generally
is used in a manner consistent with other eco-
nomic policies; however, that same evidence
falls substantially short of demonstrating that
intervention is a separate policy instrument
that can be used to manage exchange rates with
any lasting effect.
What harm is there in using an instrument
that may or may not be at all effective but at
least is associated about half the time with
success? The harm lies in the potential for col-
lateral damage by, for example, distracting the
authorities from correcting fundamental eco-
nomic policies, sending incorrect signals about
those policies, or potentially moving exchange
rates in directions inconsistent with those
policies. These considerations suggest some
of the limits on intervention as a policy tool;
it may not be effective and it may not be a
benign instrument (p. 248).
In other words, Truman views intervention as
(perhaps) a useful tool in rare situations in which
it can be used to shock or communicate with
markets, but he also thinks that it cannot reliably
be used to move exchange rates wherever the
policymaker likes. In addition, its regular use
poses the danger that policymakers might view
it as a routine substitute for changes in funda-
mental policies.11
A BRIEF HISTORY OF G-7 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
INTERVENTION 
The coordinated intervention of March 18,
2011, is one episode in an implicit policy regime—
perhaps 15 years old—that recognizes that inter-
vention can be a useful policy tool in rare and
Neely
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10 It is important to distinguish intervention to defend fixed exchange
rates, such as that conducted by the Bank of England in 1992 or
the Banco de Mexico in 1994, from intervention in floating rate
markets. Research is fairly clear that sterilized intervention cannot
replace the use of fundamentals (i.e., monetary policy) in defend-
ing fixed exchange rates. Sterilized intervention in floating exchange
rate markets is a different story, however. Unlike monetary author-
ities defending a fixed peg, exchange rate authorities can pick and
choose the time and manner of intervention in floating rate markets.
11 Truman was formerly the director of the Division of International
Finance at the Board of Governors, so he is very familiar with the
practice of intervention by the United States in the 1980s and
1990s. One might note that although the policymakers surveyed
by Neely (2008) seemed to disagree with Truman’s assessments of
the effectiveness of intervention, they did share his concern that
sterilized intervention might be used to substitute for other policies. extreme circumstances. Prior to 1996, however,
G-7 authorities intervened much more often. This
section discusses the history of intervention in
major currencies to explain the evolution of pol-
icy to its current state.
Pre-1973 Exchange Rate Policies
Governments have conducted policies to
influence exchange rates for a very long time.
Successful British, U.S., and French exchange
transactions in 1927-31 to support the British
pound, Austrian schilling, and German mark
directly anticipated modern intervention opera-
tions (Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz, 2007).12
U.S. spot foreign exchange interventions to stabi-
lize financial markets in the wake of disruptions
such as the Kennedy assassination and the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz,
2007) presaged interventions to counter “disor-
derly markets” in the 1996-2011 period.
Intervention in Floating Exchange
Rates (1973-1995)
After the Bretton Woods system of pegged
exchange rates collapsed in March 1973, G-7
currencies floated against the dollar. Floating
exchange rates tended to be more volatile than
had been anticipated and neither authorities nor
foreign exchange traders had much experience
with them. Perhaps as a consequence, G-7 author-
ities tended to second-guess market movements
by intervening frequently from 1973 to 1981.
Initially, the Reagan administration did not
view intervention as a useful tool and intervened
little from 1981 to 1985. Other countries, partic-
ularly West Germany, did intervene to attempt to
stem the dollar’s strong appreciation during that
period. The very strong dollar and the resultant
international imbalances eventually prompted
the governments of France, West Germany, Japan,
the United States, and the United Kingdom to
sign the Plaza Accord on September 22, 1985, to
cooperate to intervene to depreciate the dollar
Neely
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(see Figure 1). Perhaps partly as a consequence,
the DEM/USD exchange rate fell 3.75 percent
from September 20 to September 23 and about
37 percent between September 20, 1985, and
February 2, 1987. 
This large decline in the dollar’s value
prompted the February 22, 1987, Louvre Accord,
in which Canada, France, West Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States
pledged to cooperate to stem the dollar’s decline
(see Figure 1). Shortly afterward, these partners
intervened to purchase dollars and the dollar
remained stable only for some weeks.13
Growing disenchantment with intervention
led members of the FOMC—Governors Angell
and LaWare and President Hoskins—to criticize
U.S. intervention practices in 1989.14 Kaminsky
and Lewis (1996) report that, by the end of 1989,
the New York Fed conducted intervention exclu-
sively for the Treasury and no longer retained half
of the intervention operations on its own books.
This was very unusual as the Treasury and Federal
Reserve have typically cooperated closely on
such activities. It signaled, however, growing
skepticism about the efficacy of intervention.
The Post-Intervention Era
By the mid-1990s, authorities of developed
countries had grown skeptical about the efficacy
of foreign exchange intervention operations.
With only rare exceptions, the Bank of England
stopped intervening after February 1993 and the
Bundesbank and U.S. authorities likewise ceased
the practice after 1995.15 The Bank of Canada
stopped intervening in 1998. The European
12 Suspicious of competitive devaluations by transactions from the
British Exchange Equalization Account, the United States estab-
lished the Exchange Stabilization Fund in 1934 to “stabilize” the
foreign exchange value of the dollar.
13 Dominguez (1990) reviews U.S. intervention policies from 1985
through 1987. 
14 At the May 16, 1989, FOMC meeting, Governor Angell and
President Hoskins expressed reservations about the effectiveness
of intervention and suggested that the G-7 partners should change
other [monetary and/or fiscal] policies. Governor LaWare dissented
on a motion to authorize up to $15 billion in foreign currency bal-
ances for the Federal Reserve System (FOMC, 1989a). Criticism
continued at the August 22, 1989, FOMC meeting; Governor Angell
cited concerns about the consistency of a depreciating dollar with
the desired goal of price stability (FOMC, 1989b). 
15 The Swiss National Bank also stopped frequent intervention in
1995. In contrast to these trends, the Reserve Bank of Australia
has continued to intervene, mostly purchasing foreign currency
over the past 10 years (see Reserve Bank of Australia). Central Bank (ECB) has intervened only rarely
since its inception in 1999.16 These authorities
have made three exceptions to this aversion to
intervention: a June 1998 effort to support the
JPY, a September 2000 attempt to support the
EUR, and the March 2011 collaboration to restrain
the JPY. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of these
actions and the three post-1995 major coordinated
interventions (black arrows). 
THE GREAT INTERVENTION OF
2011
The Earthquake and Its Aftermath
The economic devastation created by the
March 11 earthquake was record-breaking, with
hundreds of billions of dollars in property dam-
age.17 As might be expected in such a circum-
stance, Japanese markets were extremely volatile.
Neely
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The great uncertainty induced in Japanese finan-
cial markets increased expectations of government
default and reduced equity prices. Figure 3 shows
that a major Japanese equity index, the Nikkei
225, fell by about 18 percent from March 10 to
March 15 and its annualized volatility skyrock-
eted to almost 90 percent, more than three times
normal levels. Figure 4 illustrates that Japanese
interest rates were already very low and did not
move much. 
Sound fundamental reasons existed for such
financial turmoil: Figure 5 shows that the index
of Japanese industrial production unexpectedly
fell precipitously from February to March, from
over 100 to less than 82. Simultaneously, as a
result of the destruction of production facilities
and the need for emergency aid, the Japanese
trade balance declined from a $5 billion surplus
in February to approximately zero in March and
a $6 billion deficit in April (Figure 6). Reduced
exports explained almost the entire decline.
The financial press reported that two consid-
erations dominated foreign exchange market
reaction to the earthquake. First, participants
expected that Japanese insurance companies
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1989: Federal Reserve
declines to intervene
on its own account.
1995: U.S., German, and
Swiss authorities cease
frequent intervention.
June 17, 1998: Coordinated











to support the EUR.
March 18, 2011:
Coordinated intervention
to stem the JPY.
Figure 2
Timeline of G-7 (and Swiss) Intervention Practices
NOTE: Timeline for G-7 (and Swiss) intervention practices after 1985.
16 Japan, traditionally very mindful of the level of the yen, continued
to intervene fairly frequently until March 2004, since which it has
intervened only twice.
17 See Hosaka (2011) and National Police Agency of Japan (2011).Neely
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The Nikkei 225 After the Japanese Earthquake
NOTE: Panel A shows the Nikkei 225 index from February 1, 2011, through March 31, 2011; panel B shows realized volatility for the
same period computed from 5-minute squared returns. The vertical lines denote the March 11 earthquake and the March 18 inter-
vention. The horizontal lines in panel B show the 10th and 90th percentiles of volatility for the Nikkei 225 index from July 1, 2003, to
March 31, 2011.Neely
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Japanese Interest Rates After the Earthquake
NOTE: The figure shows 1-month, 3-month, and 1-year Japanese interest rates from February 1, 2011, through March 31, 2011. The
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NOTE: The dark blue line shows Japanese industrial production; its one-month-ahead forecast is shown by the light blue line. The
vertical line denotes the break between the February and March observations.would need to liquidate and repatriate reserves
held as foreign assets. Second, Japanese investors
in the carry trade—in which one borrows in low
interest rate countries, such as Japan, to invest
in high interest rate countries—chose to close
out their Japanese borrowing in anticipation of
the need for the funds. Both factors tended to
strengthen the yen. The yen rapidly appreciated by
5.1 percent against the USD after the earthquake:
from 82.98 JPY/USD at noon U.S. eastern time on
March 10 to 78.74 JPY/USD on March 17, 2011
(Figure 7). Given an 18 percent decline in indus-
trial production within one month and plunging
exports, this rapid rise in the yen’s value seriously
threatened the health of Japanese tradable indus-
tries.
At the same time, JPY/USD volatility rose to
unusually high levels after the earthquake.
Figure 8 shows that (i) realized volatility reached
an annualized level of more than 50 percent on
March 16, which was three times the 90th per-
centile of its distribution, and (ii) 1-week implied
volatility reached 22 percent on March 17.18
Figure 9 shows that JPY/USD trading volume grew
rapidly after the March 11 quake, about tripling by
March 17. G-7 officials were reportedly concerned
about the effect of this turmoil on financial mar-
kets already under stress from the European debt
crisis and turbulence in the Middle East. Although
the earthquake clearly changed fundamentals and
the appropriate path of the yen’s value, Japanese
officials did not think that the fundamentals justi-
fied the observed price movements.
The Intervention to Stem the Yen’s Rise 
Despite this evidence of “disorderly markets,”
financial press reports indicated that the G-7
members were unlikely to agree to intervene.19
Neely
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18 Researchers have often measured volatility with either implied
volatility or realized volatility. Implied volatility is an estimate of
future volatility derived from option prices; realized volatility is
the annualized square root of the sum of high-frequency squared
returns within a day (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). 
19 “Yet one G7 official told Reuters that, instead, policymakers from
the world’s top industrialized economies are more likely to offer
solidarity to Japan, the world’s No. 3 economy—as opposed to















NOTE: The vertical line denotes the break between February and March observations.Neely


































3/13 3/14 3/15 3/16 3/17 3/18 3/19 3/20 3/21 3/22 3/23 3/24 3/25
3/13 3/14 3/15 3/16 3/17 3/18 3/19 3/20 3/21 3/22 3/23 3/24 3/25









NOTE: The three panels show the evolution of the JPY/USD (panel A), JPY/EUR (panel B), and JPY/GBP (panel C) exchange rates from
March 13, 2011, to March 24, 2011. The vertical lines denote the date/time of the announcement of the coordinated foreign exchange
intervention. Neely
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JPY/USD Realized and Implied Volatility
NOTE: Panel A shows the annualized realized volatility, computed from 5-minute squared returns, for the JPY/USD market from
March 14 to March 24, 2011. The horizontal lines show the 10th and 90th percentiles of volatility for the JPY/USD over the March 26,
1998–March 31, 2011, period. Panel B shows option-implied volatility over four horizons for the same market during the same period
in March 2011. Nevertheless, the G-7 finance ministers and cen-
tral bank governors held a conference call on the
evening of Thursday, March 17 (Friday morning
in Tokyo) and decided to conduct a coordinated
intervention to weaken the JPY. The G-7 issued a
press release containing the following text:
In response to recent movements in the
exchange rate of the yen associated with the
tragic events in Japan, and at the request of the
Japanese authorities, the authorities of the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and the European Central Bank will join with
Japan, on 18 March 2011, in concerted inter-
vention in exchange markets. As we have long
stated, excess volatility and disorderly move-
ments in exchange rates have adverse implica-
tions for economic and financial stability. We
will monitor exchange markets closely and
will cooperate as appropriate (G-7, 2011).
Figure 7 shows that the yen reacted immedi-
ately to the intervention announcement, surging
almost 4 percent within the hour against the
USD, EUR, and GBP. Markets responded to the
announcement of the intention to intervene rather
than to the actual transactions, because efficient
markets require a rapid reaction to publicly avail-
able information to preclude obvious risk-adjusted
profit opportunities. One might also note in
Figure 7 that the yen weakened modestly in the
18 hours preceding the announcement, perhaps
in anticipation of G-7 action. Similarly, Figure 8
shows that both realized and implied volatility—
both at very high levels before the intervention
announcement—fell significantly the next day and
even more so by Monday, March 21. Realized
volatility, for example, declined below the 90th
percentile of its distribution. Foreign exchange
turnover declined to normal levels in the week
following the intervention (see Figure 9). At the
same time, Figure 3 shows that the Nikkei 225 rose
about 5 percent over the weekend after the inter-
vention and volatility declined by the end of the
following week to normal levels, suggesting that
financial markets viewed the intervention as favor-
able to Japanese corporate profits (and growth). 
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Figure 9
Daily JPY/USD Turnover in Tokyo Foreign Exchange Markets (March 2011)
NOTE: The graph illustrates the daily turnover in Tokyo foreign exchange markets during March 2011. The vertical line denotes the
intervention announcement on the morning of March 18, Tokyo time.Are These Results Consistent with
Literature Predictions?
Are the results of the March 18, 2011, inter-
vention consistent with the best estimates in the
literature on the impact of intervention? Several
facts complicate such comparisons. First, the lit-
erature has typically assumed, for simplicity, that
intervention has a linear impact in proportion to
its size. Moreover, the fact that the clearest market
reaction was to the intervention announcement,
not to the actual intervention transactions, sug-
gests that the intervention amount might be almost
irrelevant. On the other hand, if the size of inter-
vention is important, it might be the size relative
to market turnover. Most studies of intervention
have used data from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, but turnover in the foreign exchange market
has doubled or tripled since 1995. Second, factors
such as the degree of international coordination
might be important but are difficult to quantify.
Central bankers responding to the survey in Neely
(2008), for example, tend to agree that large and
coordinated interventions are more effective. It
is difficult to cleanly compare the present results
with those of the intervention literature because
an intervention’s impact might vary over time and
with the nature of the exchange rate market. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the intervention
amount actually mattered and that markets antici-
pated the amounts fairly well, one can compare the
observed changes in the wake of the announce-
ment with predictions from the literature.
Dominguez (2003), who studied G-3 intervention
at an intraday frequency, found that a $100 mil-
lion U.S. intervention in the DEM market had a
maximal impact of almost 3 basis points. Using
daily data, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) found that
a $100 million Bank of Japan intervention had a
20-basis-point impact in the JPY/USD market.
Neely (2006) found that a $100 million USD pur-
chase caused a 5- to 6-basis-point USD apprecia-
tion in either the DEM/USD or JPY/USD markets.
Extrapolating from these estimates, one might
predict that a $10 billion intervention might cause
a 3 to 20 percent change. 
How big was the 2011 intervention? The
Japanese, U.S., Canadian, and U.K. authorities
announced expenditures of about $8.7 billion,
$1 billion, $124 million, and $125 million, respec-
tively, in the joint intervention. ECB authorities
have not publicly released its intervention
amounts, but one might interpolate from changes
in the net ECB foreign currency position that it
was in the neighborhood of $420 million. There  -
fore, the total intervention amount probably was
about $10.4 billion.20 The actual change in the
exchange rate—about 4 percent—is roughly con-
sistent with the predictions of 3.12 and 5 to 6
percent implied by Dominguez (2003) and Neely
(2006), respectively, but it is considerably smaller
than the 20-percentage-point estimate implied
by Kearns and Rigobon (2005). 
There is also a large literature that comes to
mixed conclusions about the effect of interven-
tion on volatility and higher moments (see Campa
and Chang, 1998; Dominguez, 2003; Beine et al.,
2007). The difficulty in separately identifying the
simultaneous effects of intervention and volatility
on each other might explain these mixed results.
That is, intervention responds to volatility, so
these variables will be positively correlated. Vol  -
atility does tend to decline in the hours and days
following intervention, but it is difficult to ascer-
tain whether the decline is the result of interven-
tion or simply the natural tendency of very volatile
markets to return to normal volatility levels over
time. 
Still, there is a remarkable drop in both real-
ized (current) and implied (forward-looking)
volatility associated with the March 18 interven-
tion (see Figure 8). The fact that the short-horizon
implied volatility dropped much further after the
intervention suggests that the intervention did
calm markets in a somewhat unexpected manner.
Comparison with June 1998 
The United States has intervened in foreign
exchange markets on only two other occasions
since 1995: June 17, 1998, and September 22,
2000. How does the March 2011 intervention
Neely
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20 The Japanese, U.S., Canadian, U.K., and ECB intervention data
are from the following sources, respectively: Ministry of Finance
Japan (2011), Sack and McNeil (2011), Department of Finance
Canada (2011), HM Treasury (2011), and European Central Bank
(2011).compare with those events in terms of motivation
and exchange market response? 
The June 1998 intervention also followed a
financial crisis, the 1997 Asian exchange rate crisis
in which international capital fled many develop-
ing Asian countries, such as Thailand and South
Korea. In early June 1998, the main macroeco-
nomic concern was that the yen was unusually
weak and weakening further (see Figure 1), which
made goods and services from other Asian coun-
tries less competitive with Japanese goods and
services and harmed those countries’ recoveries.
Policymakers probably feared that a falling yen
might cause China to devalue the renminbi (RMB),
possibly sparking competitive devaluations, infla-
tion, and instability throughout the region. 
Financial markets were also in turmoil in
June 1998. Panel A in Figure 10 shows that real-
ized volatility was high in the days preceding the
June 17 intervention, peaking at almost 40 per-
cent per annum, well above the 90th percentile
for its distribution. Panel B shows that the yen
weakened by about 3 percent from June 11 to
June 15.
The yen did strengthen modestly on June 15
and 16 in response to press reports that U.S. and
Japanese officials had discussed intervention.
Japanese officials had been pressing their U.S.
counterparts for cooperation to raise the value
of the yen. Prime Minister Hashimoto’s promises
of economic reform reportedly won over U.S.
Treasury Secretary Rubin and President Clinton,
who had been pressing for changes in Japanese
policy (Dow Jones, 1998). 
Rumors of strong U.S. intervention began to
leak out at 8 a.m. (U.S. eastern time) on June 17
and an official statement from the U.S. Treasury
confirmed the action at 8:16 a.m. (Hewett, 1998).
The yen then strengthened by about 3.5 percent
within the hour and realized volatility declined
to normal levels by the following Monday. The
intervention had its desired immediate impact. 
Comparison with September 2000
The recent entry of a major new central
bank to currency markets set the stage for the
September 22, 2000, intervention. On January 1,
1999, the ECB began conducting a common mon-
etary policy with a new currency, the euro, for
the 11 original nations of the European Monetary
Union (EMU). From its inception, the euro tended
to depreciate against the dollar, falling from about
1.18 USD/EUR on the inception date to less than
0.85 USD/EUR in September 2000. Doubts about
the policies of the new central bank probably
contributed to this weakness. At the same time,
the U.S. economy was slowing—it would offi-
cially enter a recession in March 2001—and the
strong dollar/weak euro was perceived as detri-
mental to U.S. exporters. In addition, the Japanese
feared that an overly strong yen would price
Japanese exports out of the European markets
(Holland, 2000). Against this backdrop, the ECB,
the United States, and Japan decided to intervene
to support the euro on September 22, 2000. The
timing of the action was surprising; it occurred
the day before a meeting of G-7 finance ministers
and central bank governors.
Figure 11 shows a pattern consistent with that
of the other interventions: There was a somewhat
modest strengthening of the euro in the 24 hours
preceding the intervention and a large (4 percent)
move at the time of the intervention with perhaps
a 1 percent retrenchment over the following hours.
As with the other intervention episodes, volatility
declined to less than the 90th percentile of its
distribution within a couple of days.
A Long-Term Effect?
A perennial question in research on foreign
exchange intervention is the duration of its effects:
Are the effects permanent? Unfortunately, this
question cannot be answered. The nature of asset
prices makes it impossible to prove that inter-
vention has a prolonged or permanent effect, no
matter what effect that intervention has. To illus-
trate this point, suppose that (i) the recent G-7
intervention increased the JPY/USD exchange rate
by 4 percent and (ii) this effect was “permanent”
in the sense that the JPY/USD rate would forever
be 4 percent higher than it would have been with-
out the intervention. Suppose, too, that JPY/USD
returns have a normal distribution and an annual
standard deviation (SD) of 12 percent per annum,
which translates into a monthly SD of about 3.5
percent. That means that within 1 month, there
Neely
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JPY/USD Market Behavior Near the June 17, 1998, Intervention
NOTE: Panel A shows the daily annualized realized volatility, computed from 5-minute squared returns, for the JPY/USD market from
June 11, 1998, to June 23, 1998. The horizontal lines show the 10th and 90th percentiles of volatility for the JPY/USD over the March 26,
1998–March 31, 2011 period. Panel B shows the evolution of the JPY/USD price over the same dates. In both cases, the vertical line
denotes the date/time of coordinated foreign exchange intervention.Neely
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Figure 11
USD/EUR Market Behavior Near the September 22, 2000, Intervention
NOTE: Panel A shows the daily annualized realized volatility, computed from 5-minute squared returns, for the USD/EUR market from
September 18, 2000, to September 28, 2000. The horizontal lines show the 10th and 90th percentiles of volatility for the USD/EUR
market over the April 20, 1998–March 31, 2011 period. Panel B shows the evolution of the USD/EUR price over the same dates. In both
cases, the vertical line denotes the time of coordinated foreign exchange intervention. is a 12 percent chance that the JPY/USD rate will
decline below its pre-intervention value and,
within 6 months, there is a 32 percent chance
that it will do so.21 Regardless of the size of the
intervention effect, the uncertainty about its effect
must grow with the forecast horizon, so it can
never be proved that intervention has a perma-
nent effect.
It is also important to note that an interven-
tion’s effect need not be permanent for it to be
helpful. That is, if intervention stabilizes markets
by correcting misalignments or simply reintro-
duces a two-sided market that prevents a drastic
overshoot of exchange rates, then a “permanent”
intervention effect would neither be needed nor
desired. Rather, the desired effect of the interven-
tion would simply be to hasten the return to long-
run equilibrium or prevent further misalignment.
In either case, the long-run value of the exchange
rate would be unchanged, although the interven-
tion achieved its goal. 
CONCLUSION
This article has detailed the circumstances of
the March 18, 2011, intervention to weaken the
Japanese yen, put current implicit intervention
policy in the context of historical intervention
practice, and compared the March 2011 effects
with those of the two other most recent U.S.
interventions: the June 1998 effort to strengthen
the JPY and the September 2000 collaboration to
strengthen the EUR.
After the disastrous March 11 earthquake in
Japan, the yen appreciated strongly against other
major currencies. The financial press cited expec-
tations of foreign capital repatriation as the driv-
ing force behind this appreciation, which rapidly
drove the yen’s value above historically implied
levels and increased volatility substantially, which
made markets “disorderly.” The G-7 finance
ministers announced on the evening of March 17
that they would intervene the next day to assist
Japanese authorities in stemming the yen’s rise.
The immediate result was a 4 percent decline in
the yen’s value and a large reduction in foreign
exchange market volatility over the next two days.
In addition, the Nikkei 225 index gained ground
and its volatility returned to normal.
In several ways, the circumstances leading
up to the March 18 intervention and the immedi-
ate results were similar to those of the June 1998
and September 2000 coordinated interventions.
In each case, special circumstances—an earth-
quake, a recent financial crisis, or a new central
bank and incipient recession—made exchange
rate misalignments more costly than usual. Finan  -
cial markets became disorderly (one-sided) as
volatility increased. Press reports of intervention
discussions might have caused modest exchange
rate movements before the actual intervention
(or announcement). Exchange rates reacted
strongly and quickly to each intervention (or
announcement), moving about 4 percent in the
desired direction and with volatility declining
substantially.
Since 1995 most advanced governments/
central banks have used intervention only very
sparingly as a policy tool. Examination of coordi-
nated interventions during this period shows
that intervention is not a magic wand that author-
ities can use to move exchange rates at will. It can
be a very effective tool in certain circumstances,
however, to coordinate market expectations about
fundamental values of the exchange rate and calm
disorderly foreign exchange markets by reintro-
ducing two-sided risk. This article has shown
that intervention remains a very effective tool,
even as its use has become less common. 
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21 If the annual SD of returns is 12 percent, then the annual variance
of returns is 0.122 = 0.0144. If returns are uncorrelated, then the 
1-month and 6-month SDs of returns are 
respectively. The probabilities that the exchange rate will decline
by more than 4 percent over 1 and 6 months are the values of the
cumulative standard normal distribution function at –0.04/0.035
and –0.04/0.085, which are approximately 12 percent and 32 per-
cent, respectively. In fact, the distribution of exchange rate returns
has considerably fatter tails than a normal distribution, so this
calculation surely understates the likelihood that the intervention
will seem ineffective. 
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